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Dalby: Gay Rights in the Military

DRONENBURG V. ZECH: FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS AND THE MILITARY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Dronenburg v. Zech, l the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, upheld the discharge of a
Navy Petty Officer on the grounds that he had engaged in homosexual relations while a member of the service. 2 The initial basis
for the discharge was Instruction 1900.9C,3 promulgated by the
Secretary of the Navy, which provided for the "separation" from
the naval service of any member who "solicits, attempts, or engages in homosexual acts."4
In reaching its decision, the court held that the Navy had
not violated Dronenburg's constitutional rights to privacy and
equal protection of the laws. The court also concluded that the
Navy's policy of discharging homosexual members was rationally
related to a permissible objectiveS and, in a larger context, that
I)

1. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
2. [d. at 1398.

3. SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978); Joint Appendix at 216, quoted in
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
4. [d. at 1389.
5. [d. at 1391. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Aside from the right to equal protection expressly guaranteed by the amendment, the
right to privacy is also found in the due process clause contained within it. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398. The Supreme Court uses the deferential "rational
basis" test when reviewing legislation challenged under the due process or equal protection clauses of the Constitution. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955). In that case, the Court upheld the state regulation of opticians based upon a
finding that the legislature enacting the law in question might have had any number of
rational reasons for adopting the challenged restrictions. [d. at 487-88.
The more stringent "strict scrutiny" test, which demands that the state have a compelling interest in the object of the legislation and that the legislation be drawn as narrowly as possible, is used when the legislation under review abridges or impairs constitutional rights or other fundamental guarantees. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). There the Court struck down a state abortion statute which prohibited abortions
(except in certain cases) at all stages of pregnancy, based on considerations of maternal
and fetal safety. [d. at 150. In Roe, the Court found those considerations not sufficiently
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there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual relations. 7 The broad dicta in Dronenburg and the fact that the
court disposed of the appeal on general constitutional grounds
applicable in a civil context makes the opinion of the court of
more than passing interest to civilians. This Note will discuss
some of the implications for both servicepeople and civilians
arising out of Dronenburg and its forebears.
II. HOMOSEXUALS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMED
FORCES - A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Despite its acceptance in the armed forces of many other
nations,S homosexuality has never been accepted in the American military.9 The military attitudes regarding homosexual relations have traditionally mirrored the attitudes of society at
large,t° with the penalties for such "crimes against nature" including expulsion from the service and even prison terms.ll This
approach is in sharp contrast to many other nations, whose
armed forces have no specific prohibitions against
compelling during the first trimester of pregnancy to justify the infringement of the constitutional.~ight to privacy. Id. at 155.
7. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397.
8. See McCrary & Gutierrez, The Homosexual Person in the Military and in National Security Employment, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW 115-46 (D. Knutson ed.
1980). Among the nations which do not specifically ban homosexuals from the military
are Japan; Spain, Italy, and the Philippines. Id. at 116.
9. Id. 'See also Bourdonnay, Military and Veterans, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW 6-3 to -4 (R. Achtenberg ed. 1985). Katherine A. Bourdonnay is an attorney in
private practice in Seattle, specializing in military law. She is chairperson of the Draft
Committee of ACLU-Washington and former Director of Military Counseling at the San
Diego Gay Center. Her Article contains much valuable information for gay people in the
armed forces or other governmental employment regarding rights and remedies.
10. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-3 to -4. Bourdonnay relates that one of George
Washington's officers, Lt. Frederick Gotthold Enslin, was court-martialed for attempted
sodomy. Upon conviction, he was ordered drummed out of camp by "all the Drummers
and Fifers in the Army never to return." Id. General Washington approved Enslin's "discharge" "with Abhorrence and Detestation of Such Infamous crimes . . . ." Id.
11. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 116. "From time to time throughout
United States military history, there have also been pogroms to rid the services of any
homosexual person who had escaped initial detection." Id. See also Bourdonnay, supra
note 9, at 6-4. Throughout the Forties and Fifties, servicemembers accused of being gay
were frequently threatened with court-martial in order to gain their acquiesence to discharge. Id. Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice permits punishment "as a
court-martial may direct" for a conviction of the crime of "unnatural carnal copulation
with another person of the same or opposite sex." 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1975). The sentence
for consensual sodomy where the participants are over 16 years of age cannot exceed five
years at hard labor. Id. § 856.
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homosexuals. 12
Generally, the various branches of the United States armed
forces have promulgated and enforced their own separate regulations regarding homosexuals, on a branch-wide basis. 13 Staff in
all branches have sought and continue to seek to exclude homosexuals. 14 When a homosexual is discovered or "confesses," the
service involved usually encourages the resignation of that person. 15 Sometimes the embattled servicemember can strike a deal
whereby he or she "voluntarily" resigns from the service, and
thus avoids administrative proceedings. 16 When a homosexual
servicemember refuses to cooperate with this general scheme,
the military's elaborate administrative machinery can be
brought to bear upon him.17
Typically, the forced separation of a gay servicemember follows the same basic course in all branches of the service.1s Once
a complaint has been received about a suspected homosexual, an
investigative agency goes to work. 19 The investigator(s) talks to
the complainant,20 to witnesses,21 and sometimes to the suspect
himself.22 The agency composes and submits a final report to the
suspect's commanding officer. The commanding officer then decides if there is sufficient evidence to proceed.23 If not, the process ends at that point. If the commanding officer elects to pro12. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 116.
13. See Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-34 n.82 (citing various regulations by
branch).
14. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6·3 to -4. The regulations and branches of service
represented are: Army, AR 635·200, Ch. 15; Air Force, AFR 39-10; Navy, NAVMILPERSMAN
3630400; and Marine Corps, MARCORSEPMAN 6207. ld. at 6-4.
15. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-5 to -6.
16. ld. at 6-6.
17. I d. The textual discussion of the administrative discharge procedure that follows
is taken largely from Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-10 to -21.
18. ld. at 6-10 to -11.
19. ld. at 6-10. In the case of the Navy, this agency is the Naval Investigative Service (NIS).
20. ld. at 6-9 to -10. The complainant could be almost anyone, from an aggrieved
lover to the recipient of unwanted homosexual advances to an informant. ld. Even military chaplains and psychiatrists can be complainants, as they are not obligated to treat
confessions of homosexuality with confidentiality. ld.
21. ld. at 6-10.
22. ld. at 6-10.
23. ld. at 6-11. The suspect's commanding officer exercises a great deal of discretion
in deciding how accusations of homosexuality against one of his subordinates will be
handled. ld. at 6-11, 6-15 to -17.
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ceed, the suspect is informed that he is being considered for
administrative discharge for homosexuality.24 The suspect is also
advised of his rights to silence, counsel, and free services of a
military lawyer. 25 In addition, the suspect may also hire a civilian attorney, if he or she can afford one. 26
Once the suspect's commanding officer has made the decision to go forward, he appoints a recorder to take charge of the
"prosecution." The recorder presents the service's case against
the accused. 27 The commander also appoints at least three officers to sit on the Administrative Discharge Board. 28 In Navy
proceedings, the officer of the rank of lieutenant commander or
above is senior member or president of the Board.29 During the
hearing itself, the president rules on objections, but a majority
of the Board can overrule him.30
At the hearing, defendant's counsel can interview the Board
members and challenge them for cause,31 usually prejudice. 32
Those Board members whom defense counsel does not challenge
then make recommendations to the suspect's commanding officer about whether or not to keep the challenged members on
the Board. 33 The commanding officer has the power to ignore the
24. Id. at 6-11.
25. Id. at 6-11 to -12.
26. Id. at 6-12. Bourdonnay suggests that retention of a civilian attorney may result
in a more forceful defense, since military lawyers are frequently overworked and there is
always a danger of conflict of interest when a military attorney openly opposes the aims
of his superiors. Id.
27. Id. at 6-15.
28. Id. at 6-16.
29. Id. at 6-15. The suspect's commanding officer exercises a great deal of control
and influence in the entire chain of events following accusations of homosexuality against
members of his command. Id. at 6~11, 6-15 to -17. The commanding officer not only
appoints the "prosecutor," but also the "judges" who sit on the Board itself. Id. It thus
seems clear that a commanding officer who seeks to influence the outcome of a hearing
has a very good chance of doing so, provided he knows his officers well. Id. See also infra
text accompanying notes 33-34 for further discussion of the commanding officer's role.
30. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-18 n.47.
31. Id. at 6-16.
32. Id. at 6-16 to -17. Bourdonnay urges defense counsel to question Board members
extensively to elicit their views on gay rights. Id. In addition, she also suggests using the
opportunity to discuss the nature of the accusations and the standard of proof necessary
to convince the Board members of guilt. In this way, Board members can perhaps be
sensitized with regard to the relative ease with which accusations are made, and perhaps
prejudices can be somewhat allayed. Id.
33. Id. at 6-17.
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challenges and allow the members involved to sit on the Board. 34
Should he decide to replace them, the defendant's counsel may
also challenge the new members, following the same
procedures. 35
For some Administrative Discharge Board hearings, the
commanding officer involved may appoint a nonvoting legal advisor 36 to aid Board members, but this is not mandatory.37 The
hearings are often very informal and often conducted according
to very lax rules of evidence.3s This is especially true at hearings
prompted by accusations of homosexuality, where the chief
source of evidence is hearsay or innuendo. In such situations,
notes one writer, "the regulations are frequently, blatantly
disregarded. "39
At the hearing, the defendant may remain silent40 or may
make an unsworn statement without being cross-examined.41 If
he chooses to make a sworn statement, however, he is subject to
cross-examination.42 In theory, no adverse inferences should be
drawn from a defendant's refusal to submit to cross-examination,43 but the fact remains that refusal to make a sworn statement, in a military or a civil court, frequently carries with it a
stigma of guilt.44
Following the presentation of evidence, the Board deliberates, returning findings of fact and recommending retention or
discharge of the defendant. 45 The Separation Authority,46 which
has the power to approve, disapprove, or modify the decision,
34.ld.
35. ld. at 6-16 to -18.
36. ld. at 6-13 n.36.
37.ld.
38. ld. at 6-18. The informality of such proceedings should be clear from the fact
that the defendant's commanding officer exercises almost supreme power in determining
the outcome. See supra notes 23, 29 and accompanying text. This power is enhanced by
the fact that strict rules of evidence are not used at the hearing itself. Bourdonnay,
supra note 9, at 6-18.
39. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-18.
40.ld.
41. ld.
42. ld. at 6-18 to -19.
43. ld. at 6-19.
44.ld.
45.ld.
46.ld.
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then reviews the Board's decision. 47 The Separation Authority
has wide discretion to order a new administrative discharge
hearing,48 to upgrade the level of the discharge,49 or even to recommend a discharge where the original hearing Board has recommended retention. 50 The final power to review the decision
and/or upgrade the level of the discharge rests with the Secretary of the Navy.51 Should the Secretary decide not to amend
the discharge recommendation, the defendant is informed that
the discharge has been approved and outprocessing will begin,
usually within a few days.52 At that point, the only feasible option for a servicemember who wishes to remain in the Navy is to
seek an injunction from the relevant United States district
court, pending judicial review. 53 District courts have frequently
granted summary judgment in favor of the service seeking the
discharge,54 although there have been some exceptions ov~r the
years. 55 In Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force,56 for example, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the
discharge of a much-decorated sergeant who had admitted to being homosexual. 57 The court found that the Administrative Discharge Board's findings were "conclusory ... without any real
explanation"58 of why the Air Force had not exercised its right
47.ld.
48. ld.
49.ld.
50.ld.
51. ld. at 6-20 to -21. The Secretary almost never modifies a discharge order, though
upgrading of discharges is not uncommon. See, e.g., Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
52. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-21. "Outprocessing" is simply the administrative
process through which an active duty military member is discharged.
53. ld. at 6-21. The jurisdiction of federal courts to review the legality of military
discharges was established by the Supreme Court in Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579
(1958). In that case, involving a soldier who sought an injunction to force the Army to
upgrade his dishonorable discharge to honorable, the Court held that the district court
had the power to determine its jurisdiction over the matter and to determine if the Secretary of the Army had exceeded his authority in granting Harmon the dishonorable
discharge. ld. at 582.
54. See, e.g., Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. See also Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d
788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980). In that case, both of Saal's co-plaintiffs
were appealing from summary judgments granted in favor of the Navy. ld. at 794, 795.
55. See, e.g., Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (Ca. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Beller
v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980). In Saal,
the district court found that the Air Force's systematic expulsion of homosexual servicemembers was irratio~al, "at least as applied to her." Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 202. See
infra text accompanying notes 65-67 for further discussion.
56. 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
57. ld. at 861.
58. ld. at 855.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss3/5

6

Dalby: Gay Rights in the Military

1986]

GAY RIGHTS IN THE MILITARY

537

to retain Matlovich in the service. 59 The Air Force regulation
under which Matlovich was ordered discharged permitted retention in unusual circumstances provided that the airman's ability
to continue to serve had not been compromised.60 Because
neither the Board nor the Secretary of the Air Force had explained how this rule had been applied in Matlovich's case, the
court ordered the case remanded,61 so that the Air Force could
present a more complete explanation and the court, in turn,
could determine if that exercise of discretion was "arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful."62 Following remand, Matlovich agreed
not to return to active duty, in return for an out-of-court
settlement. 63
When permitting a full hearing on the issues, most courts
have ruled in favor of the military.64 One exception was Saal v.
Middendorf,65 in which the district court found that the Navy's
refusal to allow an otherwise exemplary servicemember to re-enlist solely because of her homosexuality was irrational and capricious, "at least as applied to her."66 The district court ordered
the Navy to consider Saal's request to re-enlist in the light of all
relevant factors and "free of any policy of mandatory exclusion."67 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 6s It held that the Navy's actions had not violated
the due process clause,69 and that the right to privacy was not
applicable to homosexual relations, at least not in a military
context. 70 The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the
59. ld.
60. ld.
61. ld. at 857, 861.
62. ld. at 857. If the regulation were found to be "arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful,"
then presumably the classification(s) contained within it would have been struck down
by the due process clause and/or the equal protection clause. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
63. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-5. Disappointing as the denouement of
Matlovich was, it is difficult to imagine Sergeant Matlovich actually returning to active
duty, considering the resentments and notoriety that would have followed him throughout the rest of his military career.
64. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 124.
65. 427 F. Supp. 192 (Ca. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
66. Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 202.
67. ld. at 203.
68. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980).
69. ld. at 812.
70. ld. at 810-11. The court accordingly applied the "rational basis" test, and found
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case. 71
The regulations governing the discharge of homosexuals
from the military are nominally promulgated by the secretary of
each service. 72 They are regularly amended or reworded,73 but
there has been very little change in the last five years.74 During
litigation, the branch involved usually admits that not all gay
servicemembers are automatically discharged.75 Nevertheless, it
is difficult, considering the excellent service records of some of
those who have been discharged,76 to find any hard and fast
standards with regard to a decision to retain gay servicemembers.77 The question may be meaningless after the reversal of Baal, which suggested that, for the time being at least,
the armed forces enjoy wide discretion in discharging or retaining gay members.78
that the Air Force's policy of discharging homosexuals was rationally related to several
legitimate goals, including maintenance of security, discipline, and morale. [d.
71. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
72. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-3, 6-6. Though each secretary has some discretion in formulating the regulations for his or her branch, the regulations relating to
homosexuals are very similar in all branches-and similarly sweeping in their effects. [d.

73. [d. at 6-5 to -6. After the reversal of Saal, a "new tightening of policy" became
apparent in the Defense Department. [d.
74. Id.
75. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 802 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1980). In Beller, the court noted that the Navy did not discharge all homosexuals it
discovered in the service. Id. at 805. At the same time, the court also found that the
Navy's policy of discharging homosexuals, when it was applied, did not violate the constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 810.
76. As noted, Sergeant Matlovich had received numerous commendations and decorations during his military career. Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 854 n.4. In fact, Sergeant
Matlovich was a recipient of the Purple Heart and the Bronze Star, and had volunteered
for service in Vietnam. Id. "Airman" Saal also had a fine service record, having been
lauded for her "fine military behavior" and "[hJighly recommended for advancement
and reenlistment." Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 203-04 (emphasis in original). See also Nelson
v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474, 476 (3rd Cir. 1967) (a highly qualified electronics engineer was
ordered discharged from the Navy for one incident of homosexuality, despite ten years of
service, and despite the fact that the Administrative Discharge Board had unanimously
recommended retention).

77. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
78. The Beller court, while finding the Navy regulations on homosexuality "perhaps
broader than necessary," nevertheless upheld them as "a reasonable effort to accommodate the needs of the government with the interests of the individual." Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980).
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THE DRONENBURG DECISION
FACTS OF DRONENBURG

James L. Dronenburg joined the Navy at the age of eighteen. He was trained as a Korean linguist and cryptographer.
During his service with the Navy, he compiled an impressive
record of commendations for job performance and earned a top
security clearance.79 Dronenburg had been promoted to Petty
Officer after nine years in the Navy when he was enrolled as a
student at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey,
California. so
Mter a nineteen-year-old seaman recruit, who was also a
student at the Language Institute, made sworn statements accusing Dronenburg of repeated homosexual acts,S1 the Navy began an investigation.s2 Mter first denying the allegations,s3
Dronenburg admitted that he had engaged in homosexual relations in a barracks on the Navy base.s4 Shortly thereafter, the
Navy informed Dronenburg that it would seek to administratively discharge him.s5
During a two-day hearing before an Administrative Discharge Board, Dronenburg testified at length with counsel present.S8 He again admitted having engaged in the homosexual
acts of which he was accused. s7 The three-member Board recommended that Dronenburg be discharged;SS two members suggested that the discharge be characterized as "general" and the
third member voted for an "honorable" discharge.s9 The Secre79. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
80.Id.
81. Id.
82.Id.
83.Id.
84.Id.
85.Id.
86.Id.
87.Id.
88.Id.
89. Id. The general discharge is also known as a discharge "under honorable conditions." C. SHANOR & T. TERRELL, MILITARY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 239 (1980). Such a discharge is usually given for "unsuitability, which indicates some type of character problem over which the servicemember has no contro!." Id. Though a general discharge may
carry some degree of stigma for the veteran seeking post-service employment, it is not a
bar to the collection of military benefits. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(a) (1985).
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tary of the Navy reviewed the case at Dronenburg's request, affirming the discharge order, but directing that the discharge be
"honorable. "90 Following this decision, Dronenburg challenged
the discharge order in federal district court.91 The district court
granted summary judgment for the Navy, and Dronenburg appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.92
B.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The court in Dronenburg relied heavily on Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,93 in which a Virginia district court upheld a
state law which made it a felony for any person to "carnally
know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the.
mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge . . . ."94
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed Doe,95 leading the court
in Dronenburg to conclude that if a civil statute that prohibits
'sodomy (among other acts) is constitutional, then a military regulation which has the same effect is certainly permissible, given
the need for even greater restrictions on personal freedom
among the personnel of the armed forces. 9s
Dronenburg contended that Doe was not an authoritative
decision by the Supreme Court,97 since the plaintiffs in that case
were homosexuals who had not been charged under Virginia's
sodomy statute, but who merely sought a declaratory judgment
that the law as written was unconstitutional. 98 Viewed in this
90. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
91. Id.
92.Id.
93. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aft'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
94. VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1982).
95. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
96. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392. The court based this view on cases such as
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), where the Court upheld the court-martial and conviction of an Army officer accused of making statements disllPproving of the war in Vietnam. The Court found that the Army's need for discipline and combat readiness necessitated a "different application" of first amendment protections to servicemembers. Id. at
758. See also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980), where the Court upheld an Air Force
regulation which prohibited servicemembers from circulating petitions intended for Congress on military bases without the express permission of the base commander. Id. at
361. Needless to say, a first amendment decision is not necessarily dispositive of the
issues in a case based on the right to privacy.
97. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
98.Id.
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light, Doe would represent merely a concurrence in the judgment by the Supreme Court, but not necessarily an endorsement
of the reasoning of the district court on the merits of the case.99
The Supreme Court might have affirmed based on plaintiffs'
lack of standing, rather than on the district court's constitutional analysis. Admitting for the sake of argument that Doe was
"somewhat ambiguous precedent,"loo the Dronenburg court proceeded to review the plaintiff's appeal and its constitutional
bases. lol
Dronenburg based his appeal on two grounds: the right to
privacy included in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and the equal protection clause of the same amendment. l02 The court's analysis and disposition of both claims was
somewhat similar. l03
In his right to privacy argument, Dronenburg relied on Griswold v. Connecticut/ o" the first Supreme Court case to recognize
a general constitutional right to privacy. lOIS In Griswold, the
Court invalidated a Connecticut law which prohibited the use of
contraceptives,108 holding that such a law was violative of a constitutionally-based right to privacy.l07 This right was not found
in any specific section or amendment of the Constitution, but
rather in various penumbras or emanations from several distinct
amendments. lOS Portions of the "several fundamental constitu99. [d. See also Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

When we summarily affirm, without opinion, • • . we affirm
the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it
was settled. An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the
issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation
by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.
[d. at 391-92.
100. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
101. [d. at 1391-98.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, section 1 provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [d.
103. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392-96, 1397-98.
104. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
105. [d. at 485.
106. [d. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958».
107. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86.
108. [d.
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tional guarantees"I09 found in the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth,
and fourteenth amendments, when taken collectively, were
found to create a right of privacy inherent in marriage which the
state could not violate. 110 Connecticut's anti-contraceptive statute could not be enforced without violating that right, by virtue
of "the sanctity of the marital bedroom."lll Dronenburg also relied on the privacy cases which followed Griswold, particularly
Eisenstadt v. Bairdll2 and Roe v. Wade.1l3 Eisenstadt invalidated a Massachusetts statute which prohibited the distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried persons. 114 The basis for the Eisenstadt holding was the equal protection clause, and the Court
emphasized that the right to privacy applied equally to individuals, whether married or single, in "matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."115
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that no state could
prevent a woman from terminating her pregnancy by abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy.ll6 The right to privacy
discussed in Roe was founded squarely in the fourteenth amendment's concepts of "personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action . . . ."117
Based on Griswold and its progeny, Dronenburg asserted
that his right to privacy guaranteed personal autonomy and a
right to control intimate personal decisions about one's own
body, absent a compelling state interest in interfering with those
rights. lls In Roe v. Wade, the Court employed the strict scrutiny
test, the test normally used by the Supreme Court when reviewing enactments that implicate constitutional guarantees and
"fundamental" rights. 1l9 Nevertheless, the District of Columbia
109. ld. at 485.
110. ld. at 484-86.
111. ld. at 486.
112. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
115. ld. at 453.
116. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
117. ld. at 153.
118. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391.
119. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64. Applying the strict scrutiny test in the abortion context, the Court found compelling state interests in protecting both maternal and fetal
health, but these interests were secondary to the individual's right of privacy until after
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Circuit Court chose to interpret the right to privacy quite narrowly,120 as encompassing only the right to make personal decisions about procreation and childbearing.121 Having found the
right to privacy inapplicable to the issue of homosexual activities,122 the court asserted further that the cases cited by
Dronenburg could not be extrapolated to cover the question of
homosexuals in the military.123 Accordingly, the Dronenburg
court applied only the rational basis test to the Navy regulation
in question. 124
The rational basis test is the test normally used in due process and equal protection analysis when fundamental rights or
suspect classifications are not involved. 125 A court applying the
test to a statute must ask if the enactment in question bears a
rational relation to a permissible and legitimate state interest. If
a rational basis for the law is present and it is not arbitrary or
capricious, the court must allow it to stand. 126 The court in
Dronenburg found numerous rational bases for Instruction
1900.9C,127 including the Navy's need for discipline and morale,128 the possibilities of unrest if openly gay sailors were althe first trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 163.
120. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395-96.
121. Id. "The Court has listed as illustrative of the right of privacy such matters as
activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education. It need hardly be said that none of these covers a right to homosexual conduct." I d.
122.Id.
123. Id. at 1396. The court explained:
The question then becomes whether there is a more general
principle that explains these cases and is capable of extrapolation to new claims not previously decided by the Supreme
Court. It is true that the principle appellant advances would
explain all of these cases, but so would many other, less
sweeping principles.
[d.
124. Id. at 1397-98. In applying minimal scrutiny to the Navy's treatment of homosexuals, the court stated, "The Navy is not required to produce social science data or the
results of controlled experiments to prove what common sense and common experience
demonstrate." Id. The court concluded that the presence of homosexuals in a military
unit is "almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline." Id. at 1398.
125. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See also supra note 6
and accompanying text.
126. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88.
127. SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978); Joint Appendix at 216, quoted
in Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. As noted, the Instruction provided for the discharge of
any Navy personnel who "solicits, attempts, or engages in homosexual acts." Id.
128. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398.
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lowed to remain in the Navy,t29 and the danger of "homosexual
seduction" practiced by military superiors over lower ranking
servicemembers.13o Finding that the Navy's discharge of homosexuals was a rational means of effecting a legitimate interest,131
the court dismissed Dronenburg's right to privacy arguments. 132
- The court analyzed Dronenburg's equal protection arguments in much the same way.133 Dronenburg contended that
permitting discrimination within the Navy against homosexuals
would result in increased discrimination directed against other
"unpopular" minority groups within the armed forces. 134 The
court rejected this argument as "completely frivolous,"135 noting
that a failure to grant constitutional protections to homosexuals
did not thereby destroy established protections of other racial
and ethnic minorities. 13G
The court further found that naval regulations based on
morality were not ipso facto violative of the equal protection
clause. 137 Finding moral values pervasive in most of society's legislation, the court emphasized that "majority morality" is "conclusively valid,"I3S so long as the enactments involved are not in
themselves in conflict with the Constitution. 139 Since the court
had already found that there was no constitutional right to en129.Id.
130.Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1395-97. "[T]his regulation is plainly a rational means of advancing a
legitimate, indeed a crucial, interest common to all our armed forces." Id. at 1398.
133. Id. at 1397-98.
134. Id. at 1397.
135.Id.
136. Id. "The Constitution has provisions that create specific rights. These protect,
among others, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. If a court refuses to create a new
constitutional right to protect homosexual conduct, the court does not thereby destroy
established constitutional rights that are solidly based in constitutional text and history." Id.
137.Id.
138.Id.
139. Id. "When the Constitution does not speak to the contrary, the choices of those
put in authority by the electoral process, or those who are accountable to such persons,
come before us not as suspect because majoritarian but as conclusively valid for that
very reason." Id. While military authorities are accountable to the President of the
United States, the difficulty of repealing or amending a military regulation through the
political process is self-evident. This is especially true in light of the restrictions put on
the first amendment rights of members of the armed forces, as alluded to earlier. See
supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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gage in homosexual conduct, either under the aegis of the right
of privacy or as a fundamental right, and that the Navy regulations involved were rationally related to legitimate ends, the
court rejected Dronenburg's equal protection arguments. 140 The
court concluded by suggesting that the question of gay rights
was a political one, not one for the courts.141
IV. IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DRONENBURG
The decision in Dronenburg v. Zech 142 is one more brick in
the judicial wall which declares that there is no constitutional
protection for homosexual activities.143 The cornerstone of this
wall is the oft-cited decision in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.144 But even without Doe, as the Dronenburg court made
clear,146 there is a general reluctance on the part of judges to
strike down anti-homosexuality legislation because of the view
that such decisions "create" new constitutional rights. 146 The
plaintiff in Dronenburg, of course, maintained that it was not
the creation of new constitutional rights that he was seeking, but
simply the recognition of rights that he argued were inherent in
the right to privacy.147
Is the court of appeals' interpretation of Griswold v. Connecticut148 and its progeny149 consistent with the meaning and
140. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398.
141. [d. at 1397. "If the revolution in sexual mores that appellant proclaims is in
fact ever to arrive, we think it must arrive through the moral choices of the people and
their elected representatives, not through the ukase of this court." [d.
142. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
143. [d. at 1397.
144. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
145. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392. "But even should we agree that Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney is somewhat ambiguous precedent, we would not extend the right
of privacy created by the Supreme Court to cover appellant's conduct here." [d.
146. [d. at 1396-97.
147. [d. at 1391, 1395-96. The record is sparse regarding details of Dronenburg's
relationship with the seaman recruit who implicated him in homosexual conduct. In this
regard, the court stated only that the young man "chose to break off the relationship."
Certainly the question arises of whether or not a gay "marriage" or "family" situation
might be more likely to find protections under the right of privacy than simply homosexual activity in general. The court in Dronenburg did not address this issue, but it is
certainly significant in light of two more recent decisions. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760
F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 103 S. Ct. 3244 (1984). See also infra
note 201 and accompanying text for discussion.
148. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 5

546

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:531

spirit of those cases? Since the Supreme Court recognized the
constitutional right of privacy in 1965,150 it has been expanded
and rephrased in numerous ways. For example, in Eisenstadt v.
Baird,151 this right was held to encompass "matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child,"152 thus suggesting that there were some areas in
addition to procreation and contraception that were subject to
the protection of the right to privacy.153 The Dronenburg court
refused to consider the question of whether or not one's choice
of sexual partner was a matter as fundamental as the decision to
become a parent, claiming that Eisenstadt provided no criteria
for determining what rights were included in that category.154
Similarly, in discussing Roe v. Wade/ 55 the Dronenburg
court acknowledged the broad implications of the decision,158
but emphasized the Supreme Court's observation in Roe that
the right to privacy did not guarantee an unlimited right to do
as one pleased with one's body.157 But the limiting factors listed
in Roe were the state's interests in "safeguarding health, in
149. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
150. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
151. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
152. Id. at 453.
153. Id. The open-endedness of the language used in Eisenstadt is undeniable,
though time and events have demonstrated a general reluctance to extend the right of
privacy beyond the areas of procreation and contraception. See, e.g., Dronenburg, 741
F.2d at 1395-96. See also supra notes 121 & 123 (language used in Dronenburg).
154. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1393-94. Since choice of sexual partner is a vital prerequisite to making the decision to become a parent, it might well be argued that the
right to choose one's spouse or sexual partner does fit within Eisenstadt's contemplation
of fundamental rights (emphasis added). See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. Certainly the
Supreme Court has been staunch in its support for the right to marry, and for the right
to choose a husband or wife, unhampered by irrational state regulations. See, e.g., Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down a state law which made it a crime for
any white person to intermarry with someone of another race. Id. at 11-12. See also
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), in which the court invalidated a Wisconsin
statute which prevented the issuance of a marriage license to any person who was delinquent in support payments to minor children not in his or her custody. Id. at 377. The
basis for the decision in both cases was the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 377; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. In addition, in Loving, the
Court noted that the due process clause of the same amendment would also have acted
to invalidate the statute. Id. at 12.
155. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
156. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395.
157. Id. The court also remarked that Roe "provided no explanatory principle that
informs a lower court how to reason about what is and what is not encompassed by the
right of privacy." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973».
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maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential
life,"11!8 all matters that arguably do not arise in the choice of a
sexual partner. Even assuming that a statute barring homosexual activities might be based partly on a desire to stem the
spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS),lI59
there is still some question of whether or not such a purpose
would bear a rational relationship to the means used to implement it. The severity of AIDS, which has no known cause or
cure, and the fact that some seventy percent of its victims are
homosexual or bisexuallso might lend considerable support for
any law regulating homosexual activities, at least in the search
for any articulable rational basis. lSI One writer has opined,
"[T]he nature of the threat may be so compelling- that most
courts would find that closing [gay] bathhouses would withstand
any degree of scrutiny."ls2 In any event, the Navy's regulations
have nothing to do with the physical health of servicemembers,
at least at present; discipline and morale are clearly the goals of
Instruction 1900.9C.Is3 The emphasis on health in Roe thus
seems inapposite in a discussion of a homosexual's right to privacy. The Dronenburg court concluded the matter by noting
that both Roe and Eisenstadt had left the right to privacy somewhat general and undefined. ls4 It used this fact as a justification
for removing the plaintiff's claim from the right to privacy
arena. lSI!
The Dronenburg court's refusal to grant private, consensual
homosexual conduct the protections of the equal protection
158. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
159. See Comment, Preventing the Spread of AIDS By Restricting Sexual Conduct
in Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 301 (1985),
for a general discussion of AIDS and its symptoms, as well as the constitutional ramifications of attempts to halt the spread of the disease.
160. Id. at 303.
161. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); see also supra note 6
(discussing Williamson). At its most deferential, the rational basis tests seeks only any
conceivable rational basis for the legislation under consideration. Williamson, 348 U.S.
at 487-88.
162. Comment, supra note 159, at 323.
163. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389 (quoting SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20,
1978); Joint Appendix at 216). The Instruction itself states of homosexuals in the armed
forces: "The presence of such a member in a military environment seriously impairs
combat readiness, efficiency, security, and morale." Id.
164. [d. at 1395.
165. Id.
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clause was brief and conclusory.166 The court simply asserted
that a finding that there was a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual conduct in private would necessarily grant protected
status to "any and all private sexual behavior."l67 The court offered no support for this view,168 but simply pressed on to the
application of the rational basis test. Again, the regulation
passed muster .169
In his dissent in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,l7O District Judge Merhige asserted his view that private consensual
sex acts between adults were matters in which the state had no
legitimate interest, absent any evidence of harm. 171 This view
has been adopted by a few courts, most recently by the United
States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, in Hardwick v.
Bowers. 172
In Hardwick, the court struck down a Georgia statute
prohibiting sodomy,173 finding that it violated the fundamental
constitutional rights of the plaintiff, a young man who was arrested and charged with violating the statute.174 The prosecutor
refused to present the case to a grand jury and Hardwick was
released.l7I5 Nevertheless, the court found that Hardwick had
166. Id. at 1396. Indeed, the Dronenburg court stated at the outset that resolution
of the plaintiff's equal protection arguments was "to some extent dependent" upon the
resolution of his right to privacy claims. Id. at 1391. This may explain the rather brief
treatment of Dronenburg's equal protection claim.
167. Id. at 1396. "We would find it impossible to conclude that a right to homosexual conduct is 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' unless any and
all private sexual behavior falls within those categories, a conclusion we are unwilling to
draw." Id.
168. The conclusion that protecting consensual homosexual relations through the
right to privacy amounts to constitutional protection for all sexual acts is without a logical basis. California has essentially decriminali2ed sodomy when performed by consenting adults under Penal Code section 286. CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West 1985 & Supp.
1986). That statute makes sodomy a crime only when it is accomplished by force, performed on a minor, or committed by jailor prison inmates. Id. Needless to say, the
liberalizing of California's sex laws in this area has not resulted in the legalization of
prostitution, child molestation, or sado-masochism.
169. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397-98.
170. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(Merhige, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1203.
172. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th_Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985).
173. GA. CODE § 16-6-2 (1984) which makes it a felony to perform or submit to "any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. [d.
174. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211.
175. Id. at 1204.
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standing to challenge the law, based on his reasonable subjective
fear of future prosecution on the same charge. 176
The Hardwick court based its decision squarely on the right
to privacy/" as enunciated in Griswold/78 Eisenstadt/79 and
other cases in which the Supreme Court defended the right to
marry.180 Significantly, the court noted, "For some, the sexual
activity in question here serves the same purpose as the intimacy of marriage."l8l The Hardwick court also placed great
weight on the fact that the plaintiff planned to carryon homosexual activities in private. 182 Finding an absence of "public
ramifications"183 in Hardwick's case, the court applied the protections of the right to privacy to his case, and employed the
strict scrutiny test. 184 Because Hardwick's homosexual activities
were part of an intimate association analogous to marriage and
would be carried on in private, the court found that the Georgia
sodomy statute implicated fundamental rights. 181> The court
therefore remanded the case, requiring the state of Georgia to
prove a compelling state interest and that the statute in question was the most narrowly drawn means of serving that
interest. 186
176. Id. at 1205-06.
177. Id. at 1212.
178. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
179. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
180. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See supra note 154 for a discussion of both cases.
181. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
182. Id. at 1211, 1212.
183. Id. at 1212. The court in Hardwick, analogi2ed private consensual homosexual
activity to the private possession of obscene materials for one's own use. Id. The latter
activity was found to be protected by the right to privacy in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969), a case involving obscene films which the defendant possessed for his own
private viewing. One might wonder, however, if the "public ramifications" of homosexuality might be more serious or costly in a military setting. The comparison may be more
apt if we assume the existence of actual privacy for those homosexuals within the armed
forces who wish to carry on relationships and remain in the military. In reality, such
seclusion might be hard to obtain for the average serviceme~ber during the day-to-day
rigors of active duty.
184. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211, 1213. Mter subjecting the statute in question to
strict scrutiny, the court concluded that the plaintiff's fundamental rights were implicated. Accordingly, the court remanded the case, ordering that Georgia prove that the
law served a compelling state interest through the most narrowly drawn means. Id. at
1211,1213.
185. Id. at 1211.
186. Id. at 1211, 1213.
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The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari in Hardwick. Is7 The Hardwick court's heavy reliance on similarities between the plaintiff's homosexual relationships and a heterosexual marriage are especially interesting in light of some of the
dicta in the recent Supreme Court case of Roberts v. United
States Jaycees. 188 In Jaycees, the Supreme Court rejected a
challenge by the Jaycees to a Minnesota law which prohibited
discrimination based on gender in "public accomodations."Is9 In
holding that the statute did not violate the right to privacy of
the members of the Jaycees/ 90 Justice Brennan noted that the
fourteenth amendment right to privacy protects personal choices
to enter into certain types of intimate relationships,I91 primarily
those that "attend the creation and sustenance of a family."192
These family relationships, Justice Brennan suggested, are characterized by a relatively small number of members,I93 a high degree of selectivity in deciding to begin and maintain the relationship(s),194 and "seclusion from others in critical aspects of
the relationship."1911 The Jaycees' membership selection could
not be characterized in this manner and hence could not find
constitutional shelter by that argument. The factors enumerated
in Jaycees are arguably applicable to a gay relationship, and
they are very similar to the chief considerations of the Hardwick
court: privacy of the associationI96 and the similarity of the association to marriage. I97 It remains to be seen if the Supreme
Court will forcefully apply the dicta in Jaycees when it decides
Hardwick.
Many states have taken the question out of the hands of the
187. 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985).
188. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
189. [d. at 3251-52. The Jaycees permitted only men between the ages of 18 and 35
to be "regular" members, with the power to vote and hold office in the organization. [d.
at 3247. When the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters began admitting women as regular
members in 1974 and 1975 respectively, the national organization imposed sanctions, including not counting those chapters' votes at national conventions and not permitting
their members to hold national Jaycees offices. [d. at 3247-48.
190. [d. at 3251-52.
191. [d. at 3250.
192. [d.
193. [d.
194. [d.
195. [d.
196. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
197. [d.
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courts by liberalizing their laws to allow most kinds of sexual
activity between consenting adults. 198 However, twenty-five
states still have statutes that criminalize homosexual relations;199 nineteen states also outlaw certain sex acts between
men and women. 200 Even if the Supreme Court upholds the
Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick, this would not necessarily invalidate all state restrictions on private consensual sexual activity;
much may depend upon how close the questionable activity is to
a marriage or family relationship.201
Changes in the laws regarding consensual sexual relations
between adults may 'have little effect on the situation in the military.202 The military's status as a society unto itself, with severely limited constitutional protections for its members, is wellestablished.203 The willingness of the Supreme Court to allow
members of the armed forces "a different application of those
protections"204 guaranteed by the Constitution has combined
with the inherent conservatism of the military to make reform
grindingly slow. 205 The need for discipline and obedience among
the soldiers and sailors defending the United States is, as always, the justification preventing any rapid or widespread re198. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986). See also supra
note 168 for brief discussion of section 286).
199. High Court to Study Homosexual's Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1985, at Y11,
col. 1.
200. [d. at col. 3.
201. Certainly from a strategic viewpoint, it would be easier (and arguably more
consistent with Griswold and its progeny) to argue that the right of privacy extends at
least to gay "marriages" or relationships that approximate the stability of the family.
This limited approach would probably find more favor than a general "all or nothing"
approach which would seek legitimacy for all homosexual activities, no matter how casual or how promiscuous the participants. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for discussion of constitutional rights
in a military context.
203. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980). Both of these cases upheld limitations on the first amendment rights enjoyed by
members of the United States armed forces. See also supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
204. Parker:, 417 U.S. at 758.
205. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 116-17. The innate conservatism of the
American military is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the decisions to integrate
the armed forces along racial and gender lines were preceded by years of heated, often
rancorous debates. In both cases, those arguing for the maintenance of the status quo
emphasized the effects on morale and efficiency among the troops that would result from
the free interaction between white male troops and black and women troops respectively.
[d.
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form.206 There is no question that discipline and obedience are
compelling interests in a military context. The real question is,
how far may constitutional rights be denied or abridged by the
authorities in serving those interests?
One writer has estimated that the United States military
discharges some two thousand men and women each year for
suspected homosexuality.207 Many of these people, like Petty Officer Dronenburg, have excellent service records. 208 As noted,
discharge is not always mandatory.209 The Discharge Board exercises some discretion in making recommendations,210 and the
Secretary of the Navy has the power, seldom exercised,211 of appellate review. 212 The potential for inequity, for arbitrary discharges, is very great, as even a perfunctory study of some of the
better-known cases has shown.213
In formulating its regulations, the Department of the Navy
has freely generalized about both homosexual and heterosexual
members of the service.214 The presumption behind the Navy's
206. [d.
207. Futcher, Military Homophobia: Ex-Officer Fights Back, PLEXUS, Sept. 1985, at

1.
208. Petty Officer Dronenburg, as noted, had received many commendations during
his career and had received top security clearance. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. Sergeant Matlovich, as noted, was a recipient of the Purple Heart who had volunteered for
service in Vietnam. Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 854 n.4. Certainly both men's careers suggest
that the military brass' preoccupation with homosexuals as security risks were
unwarranted.
209. See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
905 (1980). See also McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 117.
210. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-19.
211. [d. at 6-21.
212. [d. at 6-20 to -21.
213. Consider, once again, the achievements of "Airman" Saal and of Sergeant
Matlovich, both of whom had excellent service records up until (and even beyond) the
discovery of their homosexuality. See supra note 76 and accompanying text for relevant
discussion.
214. See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
905 (1980). In Beller, the court included in its opinion excerpts from an affidavit submitted to it from the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel. The affidavit stated, in part, that
"the great majority of naval personnel [who] despise/detest homosexuality, especially in
the unique close living conditions aboard ships." [d. at 811 n.22. The affidavit emphasized the debilitating effects that having homosexuals in the Navy would produce, including undue influence arising from "emotional relationships with other homosexuals"
and the inability of officers or others in authority "to maintain the necessary respect and
trust from the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest homosexuality
...." [d. The concern was also raised that recruitment might be hindered "should par-
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policies on discharges of homosexuals is that homosexuals are
threats to combat readiness, security, and morale. 215 The Navy
vehemently asserts that heterosexual sailors despise and detest
homosexuality, especially in close quarters aboard ships.216 As
long as the civil courts responsible for reviewing decisions of military law accept such facile justifications, instructions such as
1900.9C217 will serve as a tool for the blanket discharge of homosexuals and suspected homosexuals from the various branches of
the armed forces.

v.

CONCLUSION

By presupposing that the majority of sailors despise and detest homosexuality and insetting up regulations to formally express these sentiments, the Department of the Navy fulfills its
own prophecy. The high command maintains the "purity" of the
service and increases the likelihood that the Navy will indeed be
composed largely of homophobic men and women by systematically discharging homosexuals and suspected homosexuals from
the Navy. Some of the most lasting lessons of life are taught by
example. Thus the average enlisted person learns vividly from
his superiors that homophobia is an admirable and acceptable
attitude in the United States Navy.
The question of the role of gay people in the military cannot
be resolved with one order. At the same time, the military's dogged refusal to evaluate gay servicemembers in terms of merit
and value to the unit clashes violently with the egalitarian traditions and ideals that our armed forces popularly are supposed to
represent. The homosexual's battle for acceptance has seen
many victories in civilian society; by contrast, in the armed
forces, his fate is usually sealed unless he can prove himself absolutely vital to his unit, and even that is no guarantee.
ents become concerned with their children associating with individuals who are incapable of maintaining high moral standards," since "[a] homosexual might force his desires
upon others or attempt to do so. This would certainly be disruptive." Id.
215. SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978); Joint Appendix at 216, quoted
in Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
216. Beller, 632 F.2d at 811 n.22. See supra note 214 for relevant discussion.
217. SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978); Joint Appendix at 216. See
supra text accompanying note 4 for relevant language.
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Apart from the considerations of the utility of homosexual
servicemembers (which can obviously only be done on an individual basis), there is the larger question of the right to privacy.
Simply put, is the armed forces' blanket power to discharge men
and women because of their sexual preferences reconcilable with
the constitutional right to privacy? In cases of incompatibility,
of course, it is patently obvious which enactment must change or
give way.
The military is not immune to the problems and controversies of the real world. The continuing separation and persecution
of a large and important group in our military can only breed
more intolerance and make the armed forces less representative
of the society it defends. Diversity (and yes, quality) must of
necessity suffer when otherwise exemplary men and women are
purged from the ranks of the military simply because of their
sexual orientation. ·As long as this "knee-jerk" reaction to homosexuals in the military persists, the sad and degrading spectacle
of discharges under protest will continue to haunt us. Like General MacArthur's "old soldiers," gay soldiers never die; and
neither will they fade away.
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